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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

EDGAR JEFFRIES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20080009-SC

:

THE ISSUE AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the State should have prosecuted Jeffries\s case under the misdemeanor
statute for an imitation substance, rather than the felony statute for a counterfeit
substance. (See Br. of Appellant). This Court will review the issue for "correctness,
affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions.v State v Gallegos, 2007
UT 81,11 8, 171 P 3d 426: see also State v Williams, 2007 UT 98. ^ 15, 175 P.3d 1029.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 30, 2007, Officer Rose was working undercover near 235 South and 500
West. (R. 56). At approximately 6:00 p.m., a woman approached him and asked what he
wanted. (R. 56-57). Rose said he was ''looking for a $20.00 rock,'* meaning a unit of
crack cocaine (R. 57-58). Jeffries then came forward and ''pulled out a twist that had
the likeness of crack cocaine the way it was packaged, pulled it out of his mouth[, ]
handed it to me and I handed him over $20.00 in cash." (R. 58). Rose could not see
inside the package. (Id.) When he opened the twist, he could see it was not a controlled

substance. (R. 59). It was sheetrock chunks made to resemble a $20 unit of crack
cocaine in terms of color, shape, and size. (See, e.g., R. 58-59).
The State charged Jeffries with unlawful distribution of a counterfeit substance, a
second degree felony offense. (R. 1-3). In connection with a preliminary hearing, Jeffries
argued the State should have prosecuted the case as unlawful distribution of an imitation
substance, a misdemeanor offense. (R. 35-41). The trial court disagreed. (R. 142:35).
Thereafter, Jeffries entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to challenge the
trial court's ruling on appeal. (R. 115-22; see 123-34); Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(j) (2009).
ARGUMENT
THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO PROCEED WITH THIS CASE UNDER
THE IMITATION PROVISIONS FOR A MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE.
This case concerns an issue of statutory construction. Jeffries was charged with
distributing a counterfeit substance, a second degree felony offense, when he delivered
sheetrock packaged as cocaine in response to an undercover officer's request for rock.
(R. 1-3; 57-59); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), (l)(b)(i) (2007) (statutes are
included in the Brief of Appellant at Addendum B). Jeffries maintains the felony
counterfeit provisions are inapplicable here. The State should have proceeded under the
imitation provisions for a misdemeanor offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4 (2007).
A. THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT
APPLICATION OF THE IMITATION PROVISIONS.
(1) The Statutes. The Controlled Substances Act makes it unlawful for a person
to distribute "a controlled or counterfeit substance". Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii).
The crime is a second degree felony offense. IcL at § 58-37-8(l)(b)(i). The Act defines a
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"[counterfeit substance" in two parts, as follows:
(i) any substance or container or labeling of any substance that without
authorization bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint,
number, device, or any likeness of them, of a manufacturer, distributor, or
dispenser other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, distributed,
or dispensed the substance which falsely purports to be a controlled substance
distributed by, any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or
(ii) any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance.
Mat§58-37-2(l)(i)(2007).
The Imitation Controlled Substances Act makes it unlawful for a person to
distribute "an imitation controlled substance." IcL at § 58-37b-4. The crime is a
misdemeanor offense. I(L_ The Act defines an imitation as "a substance that is not a
controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance, and which by overall dosage
unit substantially resembles a specific controlled substance in appearance, including its
color, shape, or size." M at § 58-37b-2(3) (2007).
(2) The Rules of Statutory Construction. Jeffries maintains that sheetrock made
to resemble crack cocaine does not constitute a counterfeit under Utah law. Specifically,
the first definition for counterfeit deals with fraudulently labeled or marked substances
that are purported to be from a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser. Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-2(l)(i)(i). The second part of the definition deals with substances represented to be
controlled substances, uL at § 58-37-2(l)(i)(ii); it should be construed to apply to
substances that do not contain markings or labels, but nevertheless are falsely represented
to be from a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser.1
1

Under that construction, Utah's provision for a counterfeit would be similar to, but still
more expansive than, the definition for a counterfeit in other jurisdictions. Jeffries has

3

Under the rules of statutory construction, this Court will look first to the plain
language of a statute. It has stated,
We read [t]he plain language of a statute . . . as a whole and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other
statutes under the same and related chapters. We do so because a statute is passed
as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and
intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with
every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.
State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, <h 10, — P.3d — (citation omitted); Gallezos. 2007 UT 81,
TJ 12 (stating a court will read a statute as a whole and in harmony with other provisions).
In addition, this Court will give meaning to the terms in the statute " c so that no
part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will
not destroy another.5" Brickyard Homeowners' Ass 'n v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d
535, 538 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted). It will assume the legislature used language
cited to the most recent electronic version of statutes from other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
21 U.S.C.A. § 802(7) (defining counterfeit based on unauthorized labels and markings);
Ala. Code § 20-2-2(5) (defining counterfeit based on false markings or label); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 16 § 4701(7) (same); D.C. Code § 48-901.02(5) (same); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 3291 (same); Idaho Code Ann. § 37-2701(f) (same); 720 111. Comp. Stat. 570/102(g), (y)
(defining "[counterfeit" based on unauthorized labels and markings; and "[l]ook-alike
substance" based on appearance); Ind. Code § 35-48-1-10 (defining counterfeit); Iowa
Code § 124.101(6), (27) (defining "[counterfeit" based on unauthorized labels and
markings; and "[simulated controlled substance" based on representation, nature,
packaging and appearance); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4101(f) (defining counterfeit); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 218A-010(7) (same); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:961(9) (same); Md. Code
Ann., Crim. Law § 5-604 (same); Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7104(5) (same); Miss. Code
Ann. § 41-29-105(g) (same); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-401(5) (same); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 24:212 (same); N.M. Stat. § 30-31-2(F) (same); N.D. Cent. Code § 19-03.1-01(7) (same);
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-101(9) (same); Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.005(7) (same); 35 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 780-102(b) (same); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-110 (same); S.D. Codified Laws §§
22-42-1(2), 34-20B-l(4) (same); W.Va. Code § 60A-l-101(e) (same); Wis. Stat. §
961.01(5) (same); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1002(a)(v) (same); see also R.I. Gen. Laws §
21-28-1.02(8) (defining counterfeit as substances falsely purported to be from a
manufacturer, distributor, or dispense, with or without unauthorized labels or markings).
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advisedly. See Carrier v. Salt Lake County. 2004 UT 98, \ 30, 104 P.3d 1208. And it
will adhere to "the principle that a general term included within a list of more specific
terms should be given a meaning that is analogous to the other terms within the list."
Kilvatrick v. Bulloueh Abatement Inc., 2008 UT 82, ^ 33, 199 P.3d 957; In re Questar
Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, ^ 54, 175 P.3d 545 (stating that ejusdem generis "'declares that in
order to give meaning to the general term, the general term is understood as restricted to
include things of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically
enumerated, unless there is something to show a contrary intent"') (citation omitted);
Moutv v. The Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 41, f 39, 122 P.3d 521 (stating it is a "basic
principle of statutory construction" that a general term is understood as restricted to
include things of the same kind as the specific term).
This Court will construe a statute to avoid absurd results. See State v. Redd, 1999
UT 108, t 12, 992 P.2d 986 ("Our clear preference is the reading that reflects sound
public policy"); State exrel. Z.C.. 2007 UT 54, If 15 n. 5, 165 P.3d 1206. It will avoid an
interpretation that renders a statute vague or that nullifies the statute's operation. See,
e.g., Gallezos, 2007 UT 81, If 11; Grayned v. City ofRockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09
(1972) (stating laws must provide standards "for those who apply them"; vague laws
improperly delegate policy matters "to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an
ad hoc and subjective basis," with the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory application);
Kolender v. Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); State v. ShondeL 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah
1969) (stating a penal statute should be clear, specific, and understandable); Utah Const,
art. I, § 7; U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.

5

The interpretation for the second part of the definition for counterfeit as set forth
herein (see supra, page 3) complies with those rules: it takes into consideration the plain
language of the definition as a whole, it is in harmony with other provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act, and it does not render other statutes inoperable or confusing.
Indeed, Jeffries's interpretation for the second definition is limited "to a sense analogous
to" the specific terms contained in the first part of the definition for a counterfeit. Nephi
City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1989); Ouestar Gas Co.. 2007 UT 79, % 54.
Where the first part of the definition for a counterfeit deals with false patented or
pharmaceutical-type drugs and fraudulent labeling or marking of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser (Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(i)(i)), the second part of the definition
should be interpreted to apply to substances in a similar class: it should apply to any substance "represented to be" (zd. at § 58-37-2(l)(i)(ii)) a pharmaceutical-type drug of a
manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser, even if it does not bear false brandings. The counterfeit provisions target parties who alter or mislabel pharmaceutical-type substances and
present them to be or represent them to be controlled substances from manufacturers or
distributors, with or without false markings. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(i); see also id.
at §§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(i), 58-37-2(l)(m) (stating it is unlawful to "dispense" a "counterfeit";
and defining "[d]ispense" to mean delivery "by a pharmacist");ijL_at §§ 59-19-102(1),
59-19-103(1) (2006) (stating that real and counterfeit drugs are subjected to a tax stamp);
U.S. Food and Drug Admin., The Possible Dangers of Buying Medicine Online,
http://www.fda.gov/consumer/features/drugsonline0707.html (stating "[counterfeit drugs
are fake or copycat products that can be difficult to identify"; "counterfeiting can apply to
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both brand name and generic products, where the identity of the source is often
mislabeled in a way that suggests it is the authentic approved product").
Based on that interpretation for a counterfeit, sheetrock packaged in a twist does
not qualify as a "controlled substance" or "counterfeit controlled substance." See_ Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3) (defining an imitation). Rather, it qualifies as an imitation: it
resembles a specific drug by overall dosage unit and appearance (i.e.* a $20 dosage unit
of crack cocaine), including color, shape, or size. Id,; see also State v. HilL 688 P.2d 450,
452 (Utah 1984) (stating baking soda packaged and sold as cocaine was an imitation);
State v. Nelson, 2007 UT App 34, f 12, 157 P.3d 329 (stating defendant's conduct fell
within the imitation provisions where he told police he packaged pesticide in a plastic bag
because he intended to trick narcotics thieves; and the packaging was typical for
methamphetamine); People v. Anderson, 848 N.E.2d 98, 100-01, 104-05 (111. App. 2006)
(ruling that a white chunky substance that resembled crack cocaine constituted a "look
alike" drug based on appearance and packaging).
In addition, the interpretation for the second definition for counterfeit, as set forth
herein, supports a workable distinction between the counterfeit and the imitation provisions, just as the legislature intended. While legislative history is not part of the text of a
statute, it may provide guidance. In this instance, the legislature enacted the counterfeit
and imitation provisions and then amended them to avoid duplication. Specifically, in
1986, the legislature defined a counterfeit as "any controlled substance or container or
labeling of any controlled substance" that bore an unauthorized trade name, mark, or the
like of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser, and which was falsely purported to be or
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"represented to be the product of, or to have been distributed by" another manufacturer,
distributor, or dispenser. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(23) (1986) (emphasis added). In
1987, the legislature enacted Senate Bill 112. (See R. 93-99). It set forth the counterfeit
definition in two parts. The first part of the definition deleted the above emphasized
language. (See R. 94). The second part of the definition relied on the phrase, "represented
to be." It stated a counterfeit is "any substance that is represented to be a controlled
substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(i)(ii) (1987). Notably, the definition in its
entirety was still contained in one sentence, separated by the word, "or". (See R. 94).
With respect to the imitation provisions, the legislature defined an imitation in
1986 as "not a controlled substance," but a substance which "by overall dosage unit
substantially resemble[d] a specific controlled substance in appearance," including color,
shape, size, "and markings", or which "by representations made, would cause a
reasonable person to believe that the substance [was] a controlled substance" Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(4) (1986) (emphasis added). In 1987, Senate Bill 112 amended
the provision by deleting the emphasized language and specifying that an imitation is not
a "counterfeit controlled substance." (R. 99). According to a legislative memorandum,
the amendments were necessary to avoid duplication between the imitation and
counterfeit provisions. (See R. 103).
The State has argued in trial court proceedings and here that the legislative
amendments served to expand the definition of a counterfeit substance. According to the
State, the second definition for a counterfeit applies to "any substance that is described,
presented, or put forth - either by words or conduct - as a controlled substance." (Br. of

8

Appellee, 11; UL_, 27 (referring to the definition as "expansive")). Yet the State's
interpretation ignores the purpose of the legislative amendments (to avoid duplication)
and it disregards the rules of construction. Indeed, the State's interpretation creates
complete overlap between the statutory provisions.
Specifically, if a substance bears an unauthorized marking and is falsely purported
to be a controlled substance from a manufacturer under the first definition for counterfeit
(Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(i)(i)), it likewise is "presented" as a controlled substance
through "conduct" under the State's interpretation for the second definition. (Br. of
Appellee, 11). Thus, the State's expansive interpretation would make the first definition
for a counterfeit superfluous. But see State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^ 35, 52 P.3d 1210
(rejecting an interpretation that renders portions of a statute redundant or inoperable).
In addition, the State's broad interpretation for the second definition of a
counterfeit would make the Imitation Controlled Substances Act irrelevant. That is, if a
substance resembles a specific controlled substance by overall dosage unit and
appearance, including color, shape, or size (Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3) (defining
imitation)), it necessarily is "presented, or put forth" as a controlled substance through
"conduct" (Br. of Appellee, 11). The complete overlap is impermissible. See, e.g.,
Brickyard Homeownersf Ass 'n, 668 P.2d at 538 (stating a statute must be construed so
that "one section will not destroy another") (citation omitted).
Based on the tools of statutory interpretation, including the doctrine of ejusdem
generis and the legislative history, the second definition for a counterfeit, which involves
"any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance" (Utah Code Ann. § 58-
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37-2(l)(i)(ii)), should be interpreted in harmony with the first definition: it should be
interpreted to apply to "any substance," that is falsely represented to come from a
manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser even though the substance contains no labels or
markings. That interpretation avoids duplication between the counterfeit and imitation
provisions, and it ensures that an imitation substance "is not a controlled substance or
counterfeit controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3).
Finally, even if this Court were to apply a more general and expansive interpretation for application of the counterfeit provisions, the imitation provisions would still
govern this case. According to this Court, it is an "established rule that when two
provisions address the same subject matter and one provision is general while the other is
specific, the specific provision controls." Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 882 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted); Carter v. Univ. of Utah
Med. Center, 2006 UT 78,ffl[9, 12, 150 P.3d 467; Hill 688 P.2d at 451 (stating the
specific statute governs). Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, a
general or expansive interpretation for the counterfeit provisions must give way to the
specific imitation provisions. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37b-2(3); 58-37b-4.
According to the facts, when Officer Rose requested a $20 rock, Jeffries delivered
"a twist that had the likeness of crack cocaine, the way it wras packaged." (See R. 57-58).
The twist resembled a specific controlled substance in appearance and $20 unit, including
color, shape, size. (See, e.g., R. 57-59); see also Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3) (defining
imitation); icL at § 58-37b-3(l), (3) (2007). The substance was an imitation. It was not a
counterfeit as that term is interpreted under the rules of statutory construction. (See
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supra, pp. 3-9, herein). Since the trial court here ruled the prosecution should proceed
under the counterfeit provisions (R. 142:35), its ruling was in error.
B. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE SHONDEL/WILLIAMS DOCTRINE
SUPPORTS PROSECUTION UNDER THE IMITATION PROVISIONS.
In the event the counterfeit provisions may be construed to apply broadly to any
substance "presented, or put forth" through conduct or words (Br. of Appellee, 11), that
interpretation necessarily would include any substance put forth as a specific controlled
substance by overall dosage unit and appearance, including color, shape, or size. Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3) (defining imitation). In that instance, both the counterfeit and
imitation provisions would contain identical elements, but different penalties.
Specifically, the felony counterfeit provisions make it unlawful for a person to
knowingly and intentionally "distribute" a counterfeit substance. LL at § 58-378(l)(a)(i). "Distribute" is defined to mean delivery "other than by administering or
dispensing a controlled substance." I(L at § 58-37-2(l)(o). Thus, the elements for the
felony offense are (1) knowing and intentional (2) delivery (3) of a counterfeit substance.
The misdemeanor imitation provisions make it unlawful for a person to "distribute" an imitation substance. IcL at § 58-37b-4. The imitation provisions define
distribute to mean "the actual, constructive, or attempted . . . delivery" of an imitation
substance. IdL at § 58-37b-2(2) (emphasis added; ellipsis added). According to Utah
law, actual conduct "presupposes knowing and intentional" conduct, State v. Fox, 709
P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985); constructive conduct requires evidence to support "power and
intent," icLat 19, 20; and attempted conduct requires proof that the defendant acted
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intentionally. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, Iffl 12, 24, 82 P.3d 1106 (relying on case
law, statutory law, and authority from other jurisdictions); see also Utah Code Ann. § 762-104(3) (2008) (stating evidence of intentional conduct establishes knowing conduct).
Thus, the elements for the misdemeanor offense are (1) knowing and intentional (2) delivery (3) of an imitation substance. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4; see also State v. Pierre,
500 So.2d 382, 384 (La. 1987) (construing distribution statute to require proof of intent).
Where the elements of two separate offenses are identical, the Shondel rule applies.
(1) The Shondel/Williams Rule. In 1969, this Court ruled that when overlapping
statutes proscribe the same conduct but prescribe different penalties, the defendant is
entitled to be prosecuted under the statute that carries the lesser penalty. See Shondel,
453 P.2d at 147-48. In State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985), this Court further
elaborated on the Shondel rule. It stated,
[T]he criminal laws must be written so that there are significant differences
between offenses and so that the exact same conduct is not subject to different
penalties depending upon which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to
charge. To allow that would be to allow a form of arbitrariness that is foreign to
our system of law. The Legislature may make automobile homicide which is
committed recklessly either a misdemeanor or a felony, but it cannot make the
crime both a felony and a misdemeanor, leaving the choice to the prosecutor as to
whether he charges a felony or a misdemeanor.
Id at 263. Also,
[the] prosecutor should not have the freedom to choose between charging either a
felony or a misdemeanor when the two crimes have exactly the same substantive
elements. We agree that that situation would deny defendant and others in his class
equal protection of the laws, "if the same identical facts may be used in
prosecutions under two completely integrated statutes, one a misdemeanor and the
other a felony."
Bryan, 709 P.2d at 261 (emphasis in original; citation omitted); State v. Loyeless, 581
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P.2d 575, 577 (Utah 1978) ("[W]here there are two statutes which proscribe the same
conduct but impose different penalties, the violator is entitled to the lesser") (citation
omitted); see also U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (ensuring equal protection).
Recently, this Court reexamined the Shondel rule. See_ State v. Williams, 2007 UT
98, 175 P.3d 1029. It recognized that the rule required "an exquisitely detailed dissection
of the plain language" of two competing statutes "to determine whether the crime
[defined by one] contained a single element that would sufficiently distinguish it from the
crime [defined by the second statute]." IcL at f 16. The analysis considered whether the
two statutes were overlapping. M The Court found the results to be "defensible" but
"not particularly satisfying." IcL at If 17. Consequently, it looked to the doctrine
articulated in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
Under Batchelder, "'when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the
Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any
class of defendants'"

Williams, 2007 UT 98, \ 18 (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia,

Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 124). The Batchelder analysis seemed to require more than a review of overlapping elements, since the defendant would have to show that the prosecutor engaged in systematic discrimination against a particular class of defendants. See id_

2

The Equal Protection standard set forth in Batchelder is reminiscent of the standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
In Swain, the Court recognized that a prosecutor may not discriminate based on race in
the jury selection process since discrimination violated the Equal Protection provision.
See id. at 203-04. However, the Court also insulated the prosecutor's arguably
discriminatory actions from challenge in a particular case unless a defendant could show
that the prosecutor engaged in a pattern of systematic discrimination in "case after case."
Id. at 223-24; compare to Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 124 (acknowledging violation when
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This Court considered Batchelder to be flawed. It cited at length to scholars
criticizing the ruling, where it gave prosecutors unchecked discretion in prosecuting
conduct that was governed by two identical statutes with disparate penalties. Id. at \ 21.
Moreover, the Batchelder rule gave legislators permission to enact overlapping statutes
proscribing identical conduct and carrying disparate penalties for use at the unfettered
discretion of the prosecutor. See_ id, (citing Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy
J. King, Criminal Procedure § 13.7(a) (2d ed. 2007), at http://www.westlaw.com).
Given the criticism aimed at Batchelder, this Court ruled that "overlapping
statutes" with identical elements are "precisely the statutory scheme to which the Shondel
doctrine is properly directed, and we conclude that the doctrine should endure to address
this unusual and rare phenomenon." M at ^f 21. Criminal laws should be written so there
are discernible differences between offenses, and so that two statutes do not contain the
same elements with different penalties depending upon which offense a prosecutor
chooses to charge. See, e.g., id. (recognizing the potential for "equal protection mischief
when two statutes "are identical in every respect except for their respective penalties).
(2) Jeffries Is Entitled to the Benefit of the Lesser Offense. Unless the
government discriminates against a class of defendants). Thus, the analysis in Swain had
the effect of shielding prosecutors from scrutiny in "case after case" until the last
defendant in the class or the series of cases would be able to establish a sufficient pattern
to support the violation. Such a process was inconsistent with the principles of equal
protection, since only the last defendant in the class could obtain relief.
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the Swain approach in favor
of an assessment that explored invidious prosecutorial discrimination in the defendant's
case alone. See. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Supreme Court ruled that
the Swain approach placed a "crippling burden" on defendants and it made prosecutors
immune from constitutional scrutiny, id at 92-93, even as they engaged in discriminatory
conduct in case after case.
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counterfeit provisions are construed to apply in situations distinct from the imitation
provisions (see supra, Argument A.), the statutory elements for unlawful distribution of
an imitation substance and unlawful distribution of a counterfeit substance are identical
for purposes of the Shondel/Williams doctrine: a defendant may be charged at the
discretion of the prosecutor under either the felony or the misdemeanor provisions for
unlawful delivery of a simulated substance. (See supra, pp. 11-12). However, the
statutes carry different penalties. See_ Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4 (defining an imitation
as a misdemeanor); kL at § 58-37-8(l)(b)(i) (defining a counterfeit as a felony).
Where the counterfeit provisions and the imitation provisions define a criminal
offense based on identical elements, Jeffries was entitled to have his case proceed under
the statute that carried the less severe penalty. See. Shondel, 453 P.2d at 147-48; Bryan,
709 P.2d at 263-64; Loveless, 581 P.2d at 577; see also Williams, 2007 UT 98, Tf 21
(stating the Shondel doctrine endures when statutes have identical elements).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, and as set forth in the briefs filed on behalf of the
Appellant, Jeffries respectfully requests that this Court reverse the prosecution under the
felony provisions and remand for further proceedings under the misdemeanor provisions.
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